A Torn Jacket Maybe Mended; But Child’s Bruised Heart is Beyond Revival”: SC Frowns on Rajasthan High Court’s POCSO Judgement

Brief: The Supreme Court held that FIR containing allegations of heinous offences having a serious impact on society cannot be quashed, even if parties reach a compromise. This is especially applicable on matter concerning charges under special Acts like POCSO.  

Case Description 

Facts 

1. 3^rd Respondent, a teacher in Aggrieved Child’s school, found her alone in a classroom and rubbed her inappropriately in the chest region. She ran out and informed other teachers but did not receive any aid. 

2. The school’s faculty asked her to remain silent and the principal asked her to sign on a blank paper.  

3. Upon receiving information about the incident, 4^th Respondent (Aggrieved Child’s father) lodged an FIR under sections 354A, 342, 509, and 504 of IPC, sections 7 and 8 of POCSO Act, and sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(b) & 3(2) (vii) of SC/ST Act.  

4. Thereafter, 3^rd Respondent and 4^th Respondent entered a compromise. They moved a quashment petition before Rajasthan High Court under section 482 of CrPC. They relied on the judgement on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303]. 

5. Despite the public prosecutor’s oppositions, the Hon’ble High Court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR along with any further proceedings against the 3^rd Respondent.  

6. Appellants in this petition reside in the same village as the 4^th Respondent. They challenged the quashment order before the Hon’ble Apex Court under Article 32 of Indian Constitution. 

Issues 

1. Whether a third party can appeal under article 136 of Indian Constitution, against High Court’s order to quash an FIR containing serious offences, after the parties to the complaint reach a compromise? 

2. Whether criminal proceedings or FIR concerning serious offences having serious impact on society be quashed merely because the offender and aggrieved minor’s parent(s) reached compromise relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab? 

Laws Involved 

• Sections 354A, 342, 509 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) 

• Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”) 

• Section 482 and 173(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) 

• Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(b) & 3(2) (vii) of the Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST Act”) 

Petitioner’s Arguments 

1. FIR registered against 3^rd Respondent had serious allegations under IPC and POCSO Act.  

2. Reliance on Gian Singh case requires the offences to be of private nature. In the current instance, offences alleged have a serious impact on society. If the 3^rd Respondent is left untried, it will not only be an injustice to the victim, but it might also result in reoccurrence of the incidents.  

Respondents’ Arguments 

1. Order to quash the FIR and the further proceeding stemmed from a compromise between the Aggrieved Child’s father (4^th Respondent) and the 3^rd Respondent.  

2. Relying on Gian Singh’s ratio—“ if it is convinced that offences are entirely personal in nature and do not affect the public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the same by exercising the inherent powers vested in it,”— the Court quashed the FIR.  

3. Considering these factors, Appellants do not possess locus standi to interfere. 

Amicus Curie’s Insight 

1. A public-spirited person has the locus standi to petition under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution to ensure deliverance of justice.  

2. In the present instance, State did not take up the matter in accordance with law and issued an order of quashment despite public prosecutor’s opposition.  

3. If a public-spirited person is not granted locus standi to challenge such decisions, it will only aid the offender to escape without a trial.  

4. Further, Gian Singh’s decision requires that the compromise should satisfy the conscience of the court. The settlement must be fair and uninfluenced by pressure. Furthermore, the judgement clearly highlighted that compromise in matters of offences of moral turpitude under special statutes do have a legal sanction.  

Also read: SC holds ‘watching child pornography’ to be within the ambit of section 15 POCSO 

Court’s Analysis 

I. With regards to Appellants’ locus standi 

1. Owing to the difficulty of trying the issue under Article 32, the Court converted the writ into a Special Leave Petition under Article 136.  

2. Further, relying on Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham [(1979) 2 SCC 297] & Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh [(1978) 3 SCC 279], the Court emphasized that a private party could prefer an appeal against acquittal under the jurisdiction of Article 136, if the acquittal resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. 

3. Decisions relied upon related to judgement of acquittal. In their light, the present case stands on much firmer footing since the 3^rd Respondent did not even face trial.  

4. The Appellants are ordinary people and reside at the same village as the Aggrieved Child and her family. They do not have any malicious intention or motive for revenge against the Respondents. 

5. Since the allegations raised against the 3^rd Respondent are heinous crimes against society, there are no grounds to revoke the leave granted to the appellants. 

II. With regards to POCSO Act 

• Based on POCSO Act’s Statement and Objective, it is undoubtedly clear that quashment of proceedings initiated under POCSO Act without a trial, and without there being any exceptionally compelling reasons, goes against the intentions of the enactment. 
• Rubbing a child’s breast constitutes the offence of sexual harassment under Section 7 of POCSO Act. Moreover, it is a heinous and serious offence. Commission of such offence must be perceived as an offence against the society.  

III. With regards to Gian Singh’s and compromise between parties 

1. The High Court cannot quash an FIR or proceeding relating to offences that are heinous and have serious impact on society, even at the instance of Aggrieved Child or her parents/guardians.  

2. Further, as per the Gian Singh’s judgement, the High Courts have the obligation to consider the nature and gravity of the offences before issuing a quashment order. 

3. In the current instance, the FIR was lodged on 08.01.2022 and the compromise was entered on 31.01.2022. A bare perusal of the concerned order reveals that the High Court failed to place reasonable consideration on the facts of the issue. 

4. The Supreme Court, in its decision in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688], held that whether an FIR can be quashed depends on facts of each case. The Court entertaining the matter must apply its mind to ascertain:  

5. Based on the above, it is unfathomable how the Rajasthan High Court decided to quash the FIR. The Aggrieved Child mentioned in her statement that the 4^th Respondent faced pressure from the 3^rd Respondent against filing of the complaint. Despite this fact, the Court was unable to comprehend whether the compromise can be acted upon. 

Conclusion 

The Hon’ble Apex Court concluded: 

• Although Appellants are not party to the concerned order, they have the right to approach the Court under Article 136 and appeal against a decision that results in a serious miscarriage of justice.  

• Offences alleged against 3^rd Respondent are heinous and have a serious impact on society. They cannot be deemed as matter of private nature and quashed after a compromise.  

• The Rajasthan High Court erred in passing a quashment order. Compromise between parties or remote chance of conviction cannot be grounds for termination of investigation in cases like these.  

• Therefore, the impugned order of High Court’s is quashed and set aside. Further, investigations and criminal proceedings pursuant to the report filed under section 173(2) CrPC are to proceed against the Accused in accordance with law.  

Authored by Ayush Bardhan, Trainee Associate, The Legal Swan